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Anycast anónimo basado en firmas de grupo
dc.contributor.author | Corena, Juan Camilo | spa |
dc.contributor.author | Posada, Jaime Andrés | spa |
dc.date.accessioned | 2020-10-27T00:20:41Z | |
dc.date.available | 2020-10-27T00:20:41Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2010-06-01 | |
dc.identifier.issn | 2539-2115 | |
dc.identifier.issn | 1657-2831 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12749/8952 | |
dc.description.abstract | Presentamos en este artículo un esquema criptográfico para la implementación de grupos Anycast dentro de un sistema de enrutamiento anónimo con n miembros, que ya cuente con una llave pública por cada uno de ellos y una llave simétrica compartida por cada pareja de los mismos. Nuestro esquema permite la comprobación de la recepción por cualquiera de los destinatarios legítimos de un mensaje y la emisión de recibos firmados digitalmente al emisor sin necesidad de generar llaves de firmado para cada uno de los 2^n posibles grupos Anycast en la red. En total se usarán n llaves asimétricas para firmas de los recibos y (n(n-1))/2 llaves simétricas para proteger las comunicaciones entre miembros. Dentro de las principales características de nuestro sistema se encuentran: i) El balanceo de cargas en redes anónimas, mientras se protege a los generadores de las peticiones de ataques de spoofing por parte de impostores. ii) Obligar a los usuarios a utilizar el sistema de balanceo de cargas, al estos no tener acceso a las direcciones de la red, pero si a las llaves de firmado, con lo cual un atacante debe realizar un ataque a escala global de la red para atacar a un grupo Anycast específico. Posibles aplicaciones del sistema incluyen tolerancia a fallas en servicios de nombres y replicación de datos. | spa |
dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | spa |
dc.language.iso | spa | spa |
dc.publisher | Universidad Autónoma de Bucaramanga UNAB | |
dc.relation | https://revistas.unab.edu.co/index.php/rcc/article/view/1251/1177 | |
dc.relation.uri | https://revistas.unab.edu.co/index.php/rcc/article/view/1251 | |
dc.rights | Derechos de autor 2010 Revista Colombiana de Computación | |
dc.rights.uri | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/ | * |
dc.rights.uri | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/co/ | |
dc.source | Revista Colombiana de Computación; Vol. 11 Núm. 1 (2010): Revista Colombiana de Computación; 27-40 | |
dc.subject | Ingeniería de sistemas | |
dc.subject | Investigaciones | |
dc.subject | Tecnologías de la información y las comunicaciones | |
dc.subject | TIC´s | |
dc.title | Anycast anónimo basado en firmas de grupo | |
dc.title.translated | Anonymous Anycast based on group signatures | |
dc.publisher.faculty | Facultad Ingeniería | |
dc.publisher.program | Pregrado Ingeniería de Sistemas | |
dc.type.driver | info:eu-repo/semantics/article | |
dc.type.local | Artículo | spa |
dc.type.coar | http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_7a1f | |
dc.subject.keywords | Technological innovations | eng |
dc.subject.keywords | Computer science | eng |
dc.subject.keywords | Technology development | eng |
dc.subject.keywords | Systems engineering | eng |
dc.subject.keywords | Investigations | eng |
dc.subject.keywords | Information and communication technologies | eng |
dc.subject.keywords | ICT's | eng |
dc.subject.keywords | Group signatrues | |
dc.subject.keywords | Anonymous networks | |
dc.identifier.instname | instname:Universidad Autónoma de Bucaramanga UNAB | spa |
dc.type.hasversion | info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion | |
dc.rights.accessrights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess | spa |
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dc.relation.references | R. Rivest, A. Shamir, and L. Adleman. A method for obtaining digital signatures and public-key cryptosystems. Communications of the ACM, 21:120-126, 1978 | |
dc.relation.references | R. L. Rivest, A. Shamir, and Y. Tauman. How to leak a secret. In Proceedings of the 7TH International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security: Advances in Cryptology, pages 554-567. Springer-Verlag, 2001 | |
dc.contributor.cvlac | Corena, Juan Camilo [0001352950] | |
dc.subject.lemb | Innovaciones tecnológicas | |
dc.subject.lemb | Desarrollo de tecnología | |
dc.subject.lemb | Ciencia de los computadores | |
dc.identifier.repourl | repourl:https://repository.unab.edu.co | |
dc.description.abstractenglish | We present in this article a cryptographic scheme to implement anycastgroups in an nmember anonymous network where each participant owns a public key and there is a symmetric key for every pair of nodes. Our system allows the clients to receive a digitally signed receipt from any of the legitimate receivers of a message without ngenerating keys for each one of the 2 possible anycast groups within the network. In total we will use h assymetric keys to sign receipts and symmetric keys to protect communications between every two members. The main characteristics of our system are: i)Load balancing in anonymous networks along with spoofing protection to clients. ii)The load balancing system is mandatory and cannot be bypassed since clients do not have the network level addresses of a given anycast group, that is why in order to attack a particualr anycast group a network scale attack must be performed. Possible aplications for our system include fault tolerance, name services and data replication. | eng |
dc.subject.proposal | Firmas de grupo | |
dc.subject.proposal | Anycast | |
dc.subject.proposal | Redes anónimas | |
dc.type.redcol | http://purl.org/redcol/resource_type/CJournalArticle | |
dc.rights.creativecommons | Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International | * |