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Análisis de la formación de precios en una subasta de electricidad: Una aproximación para el caso colombiano
dc.contributor.advisor | Rodríguez Marín, Juan Carlos | spa |
dc.contributor.author | Chahin Salcedo, Roger | spa |
dc.coverage.spatial | Bucaramanga (Santander, Colombia) | spa |
dc.coverage.temporal | 2020 | spa |
dc.date.accessioned | 2021-03-23T15:47:06Z | |
dc.date.available | 2021-03-23T15:47:06Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2020-07-17 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12749/12481 | |
dc.description.abstract | La existencia de fallas de mercado en el mercado energético permite el ejercicio de conductas estratégicas en las que los agentes para apropiarse de parte del beneficio de los consumidores, generando pérdidas irrecuperables de eficiencia en los mercados (Wolfram, 1999). Es por esto por lo que el objetivo del presente documento es analizar el comportamiento estratégico de los generadores en la formación de precios de energía eléctrica, mediante un experimento de simulación de la subasta de energía eléctrica en Colombia. Para esto, se utiliza como referente metodológico el artículo de Rassenti, Smith y Wilson (2003) para establecer dos escenarios de subasta: la subasta de precio uniforme y subasta de discriminación de precios (UPA y DPA). En últimas, se espera que este trabajo pueda aportar una guía para realizar simulaciones del mercado energético en el que los participantes puedan analizar los incentivos de licitación o fijación de precios de los generadores de energía eléctrica | spa |
dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | spa |
dc.language.iso | spa | spa |
dc.rights.uri | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/co/ | * |
dc.title | Análisis de la formación de precios en una subasta de electricidad: Una aproximación para el caso colombiano | spa |
dc.title.translated | Analysis of price formation in an auction of electricity: An approximation for the Colombian case | spa |
dc.degree.name | Economista | spa |
dc.publisher.grantor | Universidad Autónoma de Bucaramanga UNAB | spa |
dc.rights.local | Abierto (Texto Completo) | spa |
dc.publisher.faculty | Facultad Economía y Negocios | spa |
dc.publisher.program | Pregrado Economía | spa |
dc.description.degreelevel | Pregrado | spa |
dc.type.driver | info:eu-repo/semantics/bachelorThesis | |
dc.type.local | Trabajo de Grado | spa |
dc.type.coar | http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_7a1f | |
dc.subject.keywords | Economics | eng |
dc.subject.keywords | Economic development | eng |
dc.subject.keywords | Price formation | eng |
dc.subject.keywords | Energy market | eng |
dc.subject.keywords | Agent-based simulation | eng |
dc.subject.keywords | Auctions | eng |
dc.subject.keywords | Electricity | eng |
dc.subject.keywords | Electric power | eng |
dc.subject.keywords | Electric markets | eng |
dc.identifier.instname | instname:Universidad Autónoma de Bucaramanga - UNAB | spa |
dc.identifier.reponame | reponame:Repositorio Institucional UNAB | spa |
dc.type.hasversion | info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion | |
dc.rights.accessrights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess | spa |
dc.rights.accessrights | http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2 | spa |
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dc.contributor.cvlac | https://scienti.minciencias.gov.co/cvlac/visualizador/generarCurriculoCv.do?cod_rh=0000191507 | * |
dc.contributor.googlescholar | https://scholar.google.es/citations?hl=es&user=A94IYtMAAAAJ | * |
dc.contributor.orcid | https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3442-2052 | * |
dc.subject.lemb | Economía | spa |
dc.subject.lemb | Desarrollo económico | spa |
dc.subject.lemb | Electricidad | spa |
dc.subject.lemb | Energía eléctrica | spa |
dc.subject.lemb | Mercados eléctricos | spa |
dc.identifier.repourl | repourl:https://repository.unab.edu.co | spa |
dc.description.abstractenglish | The existence of market failures in the energy market allows the exercise of strategic behaviors in which agents to appropriate part of the benefit of consumers, generating irrecoverable losses of efficiency in the markets (Wolfram, 1999). This is why the objective of this document is to analyze the strategic behavior of generators in the formation of electricity prices, through a simulation experiment of the electricity auction in Colombia. For this, the article by Rassenti, Smith and Wilson (2003) is used as a methodological reference to establish two auction scenarios: the uniform price auction and the price discrimination auction (UPA and DPA). Ultimately, it is hoped that this work can provide a guide to carry out simulations of the energy market in which participants can analyze the incentives for bidding or fixing of prices of electric power generators | eng |
dc.subject.proposal | Formación de precios | spa |
dc.subject.proposal | Mercado energético | spa |
dc.subject.proposal | Simulación basada en agentes | spa |
dc.subject.proposal | Subastas | spa |
dc.type.redcol | http://purl.org/redcol/resource_type/TP | |
dc.rights.creativecommons | Atribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 2.5 Colombia | * |
dc.coverage.campus | UNAB Campus Bucaramanga | spa |
dc.description.learningmodality | Modalidad Presencial | spa |
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