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Lying game: relación causal entre participación política y honestidad en un contexto de toma de decisiones económicas entre estudiantes universitarios
dc.contributor.advisor | Gamboa Vesga, Yudy Adriana | spa |
dc.contributor.author | Almeida Ramírez, Alexander | spa |
dc.contributor.author | Fiallo Herrera, Laura Daniela | spa |
dc.coverage.spatial | Bucaramanga (Santander, Colombia) | spa |
dc.coverage.temporal | 2020 | spa |
dc.date.accessioned | 2021-02-08T13:46:01Z | |
dc.date.available | 2021-02-08T13:46:01Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2020-11-07 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12749/12147 | |
dc.description.abstract | La deshonestidad es un comportamiento frecuente en las interacciones sociales que, en las altas esferas del poder, generan pérdidas económicas y afectan la percepción de la democracia. Por tal motivo se desarrolló la presente investigación, cuyo objetivo consiste en determinar el efecto causal de la propensión a la deshonestidad sobre la participación política. Los sujetos de estudio fueron estudiantes universitarios y se utilizó como metodología el experimento de los dados repetidos de Hanna y Wang (2017) y de la moneda de Bucciol y Piovesan (2011), con el fin de medir la propensión a mentir de los participantes y relacionarlo con una encuesta sobre preferencias laborales. El principal hallazgo es que no existe una relación entre los niveles de engaño de las personas y su preferencia a trabajar en el sector público. Igualmente, que la preferencia por el sector financiero está correlacionada positivamente con las tasas de engaño en el juego de la mentira | spa |
dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | spa |
dc.language.iso | spa | spa |
dc.rights.uri | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/co/ | * |
dc.title | Lying game: relación causal entre participación política y honestidad en un contexto de toma de decisiones económicas entre estudiantes universitarios | spa |
dc.title.translated | Lying game: causal relationship between political participation and honesty in an economic decision-making context among university students | spa |
dc.degree.name | Economista | spa |
dc.publisher.grantor | Universidad Autónoma de Bucaramanga UNAB | spa |
dc.rights.local | Abierto (Texto Completo) | spa |
dc.publisher.faculty | Facultad Economía y Negocios | spa |
dc.publisher.program | Pregrado Economía | spa |
dc.description.degreelevel | Pregrado | spa |
dc.type.driver | info:eu-repo/semantics/bachelorThesis | |
dc.type.local | Trabajo de Grado | spa |
dc.type.coar | http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_7a1f | |
dc.subject.keywords | Economics | eng |
dc.subject.keywords | Economic development | eng |
dc.subject.keywords | Dishonesty | eng |
dc.subject.keywords | Experimental economics | eng |
dc.subject.keywords | Lying game | eng |
dc.subject.keywords | Public service | eng |
dc.subject.keywords | Corruption | eng |
dc.subject.keywords | Political participation | eng |
dc.subject.keywords | Economic sociology | eng |
dc.identifier.instname | instname:Universidad Autónoma de Bucaramanga - UNAB | spa |
dc.identifier.reponame | reponame:Repositorio Institucional UNAB | spa |
dc.type.hasversion | info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion | |
dc.rights.accessrights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess | spa |
dc.rights.accessrights | http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2 | spa |
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dc.contributor.cvlac | https://scienti.minciencias.gov.co/cvlac/visualizador/generarCurriculoCv.do?cod_rh=0001472271 | * |
dc.contributor.googlescholar | https://scholar.google.es/citations?hl=es&user=aIuyns8AAAAJ | * |
dc.contributor.researchgate | https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Yudy_Gamboa | * |
dc.subject.lemb | Economía | spa |
dc.subject.lemb | Desarrollo económico | spa |
dc.subject.lemb | Participación política | spa |
dc.subject.lemb | Sociología económica | spa |
dc.identifier.repourl | repourl:https://repository.unab.edu.co | spa |
dc.description.abstractenglish | Dishonesty is a frequent behavior in social interactions that in the high spheres of power, generate economic losses and affect the perception of democracy. For this reason, this research was developed to determine the causal effect of the propensity to dishonesty on political participation. The subjects of the study were university students and the methodology used was the experiment of the repeated dice of Hanna and Wang (2017) and the coin of Bucciol and Piovesan (2011), in order to measure the propensity to lie of the participants and relate it to a survey on labor preferences. The main finding is that there is no relationship between people's levels of lies and their preference to work in the public sector. Furthermore, the preference for the financial sector is positively correlated with rates of deception in the lying game | eng |
dc.subject.proposal | Deshonestidad | spa |
dc.subject.proposal | Economía experimental | spa |
dc.subject.proposal | Juego de la mentira | spa |
dc.subject.proposal | Servicio público | spa |
dc.subject.proposal | Corrupción | spa |
dc.type.redcol | http://purl.org/redcol/resource_type/TP | |
dc.rights.creativecommons | Atribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 2.5 Colombia | * |
dc.coverage.campus | UNAB Campus Bucaramanga | spa |
dc.description.learningmodality | Modalidad Presencial | spa |
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