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dc.contributor.advisorGamboa Vesga, Yudy Adrianaspa
dc.contributor.authorAlmeida Ramírez, Alexanderspa
dc.contributor.authorFiallo Herrera, Laura Danielaspa
dc.coverage.spatialBucaramanga (Santander, Colombia)spa
dc.coverage.temporal2020spa
dc.date.accessioned2021-02-08T13:46:01Z
dc.date.available2021-02-08T13:46:01Z
dc.date.issued2020-11-07
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12749/12147
dc.description.abstractLa deshonestidad es un comportamiento frecuente en las interacciones sociales que, en las altas esferas del poder, generan pérdidas económicas y afectan la percepción de la democracia. Por tal motivo se desarrolló la presente investigación, cuyo objetivo consiste en determinar el efecto causal de la propensión a la deshonestidad sobre la participación política. Los sujetos de estudio fueron estudiantes universitarios y se utilizó como metodología el experimento de los dados repetidos de Hanna y Wang (2017) y de la moneda de Bucciol y Piovesan (2011), con el fin de medir la propensión a mentir de los participantes y relacionarlo con una encuesta sobre preferencias laborales. El principal hallazgo es que no existe una relación entre los niveles de engaño de las personas y su preferencia a trabajar en el sector público. Igualmente, que la preferencia por el sector financiero está correlacionada positivamente con las tasas de engaño en el juego de la mentiraspa
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdfspa
dc.language.isospaspa
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/co/*
dc.titleLying game: relación causal entre participación política y honestidad en un contexto de toma de decisiones económicas entre estudiantes universitariosspa
dc.title.translatedLying game: causal relationship between political participation and honesty in an economic decision-making context among university studentsspa
dc.degree.nameEconomistaspa
dc.publisher.grantorUniversidad Autónoma de Bucaramanga UNABspa
dc.rights.localAbierto (Texto Completo)spa
dc.publisher.facultyFacultad Ciencias Económicas, Administrativas y Contablesspa
dc.publisher.programPregrado Economíaspa
dc.description.degreelevelPregradospa
dc.type.driverinfo:eu-repo/semantics/bachelorThesis
dc.type.localTrabajo de Gradospa
dc.type.coarhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_7a1f
dc.subject.keywordsEconomicseng
dc.subject.keywordsEconomic developmenteng
dc.subject.keywordsDishonestyeng
dc.subject.keywordsExperimental economicseng
dc.subject.keywordsLying gameeng
dc.subject.keywordsPublic serviceeng
dc.subject.keywordsCorruptioneng
dc.subject.keywordsPolitical participationeng
dc.subject.keywordsEconomic sociologyeng
dc.identifier.instnameinstname:Universidad Autónoma de Bucaramanga - UNABspa
dc.identifier.reponamereponame:Repositorio Institucional UNABspa
dc.type.hasversioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion
dc.rights.accessrightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessspa
dc.rights.accessrightshttp://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2spa
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dc.contributor.cvlachttps://scienti.minciencias.gov.co/cvlac/visualizador/generarCurriculoCv.do?cod_rh=0001472271*
dc.contributor.googlescholarhttps://scholar.google.es/citations?hl=es&user=aIuyns8AAAAJ*
dc.contributor.researchgatehttps://www.researchgate.net/profile/Yudy_Gamboa*
dc.subject.lembEconomíaspa
dc.subject.lembDesarrollo económicospa
dc.subject.lembParticipación políticaspa
dc.subject.lembSociología económicaspa
dc.identifier.repourlrepourl:https://repository.unab.edu.cospa
dc.description.abstractenglishDishonesty is a frequent behavior in social interactions that in the high spheres of power, generate economic losses and affect the perception of democracy. For this reason, this research was developed to determine the causal effect of the propensity to dishonesty on political participation. The subjects of the study were university students and the methodology used was the experiment of the repeated dice of Hanna and Wang (2017) and the coin of Bucciol and Piovesan (2011), in order to measure the propensity to lie of the participants and relate it to a survey on labor preferences. The main finding is that there is no relationship between people's levels of lies and their preference to work in the public sector. Furthermore, the preference for the financial sector is positively correlated with rates of deception in the lying gameeng
dc.subject.proposalDeshonestidadspa
dc.subject.proposalEconomía experimentalspa
dc.subject.proposalJuego de la mentiraspa
dc.subject.proposalServicio públicospa
dc.subject.proposalCorrupciónspa
dc.type.redcolhttp://purl.org/redcol/resource_type/TP
dc.rights.creativecommonsAtribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 2.5 Colombia*


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