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dc.contributor.authorGhotme Ghotme, Rafat Ahmedspa
dc.contributor.authorRipoll, Alejandraspa
dc.date.accessioned2020-10-27T15:12:12Z
dc.date.available2020-10-27T15:12:12Z
dc.date.issued2018-07-12
dc.identifier.issn2590-8669|0124-0781
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12749/10768
dc.description.abstractEl régimen libio fue intervenido en el 2011 por la OTAN, luego de haber sido acusado de estar preparando una “masacre” contra su propia población. Esa intervención, liderada por Francia y Estados Unidos, se hizo en nombre de la responsabilidad de proteger, de acuerdo con un mandato de la ONU que instaba a sus miembros a usar “todos los medios necesarios” para evitar “ataques generalizados y sistemáticos contra la población civil”. ¿Estuvo en realidad esa intervención impulsada por valores morales y la responsabilidad de proteger a la población libia? El propósito de este artículo es demostrar que la intervención de la OTAN se asemeja a una clásica operación de “cambio de régimen” mediada por consideraciones “materiales” y que poco tuvo que ver con consideraciones humanitarias. La intervención de la OTAN, asimismo, desestructuraría las propuestas para implementar un cambio pacífico, arrasando consigo a centenares de miles de personas, convirtiendo a Libia en un Estado fallido y provocando la aparición de múltiples facciones armadas islamistasspa
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdfspa
dc.format.mimetypeApplication/xmlspa
dc.language.isospaspa
dc.publisherUNAB
dc.relationhttps://revistas.unab.edu.co/index.php/reflexion/article/view/3298/2823|Https://revistas.unab.edu.co/index.php/reflexion/article/view/3298/2966
dc.relation.urihttps://revistas.unab.edu.co/index.php/reflexion/article/view/3298
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/co/
dc.sourceReflexión Política; Vol. 20 No. 39 (2018): Reflexión Política (enero a junio); 107-121
dc.subjectCiencias jurídicas y políticas
dc.subjectDerecho
dc.subjectInvestigaciones
dc.subjectLegislación
dc.titleResponsabilidad de proteger (los intereses): El caso de la intervención de la OTAN en Libiaspa
dc.title.translatedResponsibility to Protect (interests). The Case of NATO Intervention in Libya
dc.type.driverinfo:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.type.localArtículospa
dc.type.coarhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_7a1f
dc.subject.keywordsLegal and Political Scienceseng
dc.subject.keywordsLaweng
dc.subject.keywordsInvestigationseng
dc.subject.keywordsLegislationeng
dc.subject.keywordsLibyaeng
dc.subject.keywordsResponsibility to protecteng
dc.subject.keywordsInterventionismeng
dc.subject.keywordsNATOeng
dc.subject.keywordsRealismeng
dc.identifier.instnameinstname:Universidad Autónoma de Bucaramanga UNABspa
dc.type.hasversionInfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
dc.type.hasversioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion
dc.rights.accessrightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessspa
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dc.contributor.cvlacGhotme Ghotme, Rafat Ahmed [0000732150]spa
dc.contributor.orcidGhotme Ghotme, Rafat Ahmed [0000-0002-6270-4498]spa
dc.contributor.orcidRipoll, Alejandra [0000-0001-7947-8952]spa
dc.subject.lembCiencias jurídicas y políticasspa
dc.subject.lembDerechospa
dc.subject.lembInvestigacionesspa
dc.subject.lembLegislaciónspa
dc.identifier.repourlrepourl:https://repository.unab.edu.co
dc.description.abstractenglishThe Libyan regime was intervened in 2011 by NATO, after being accused of preparing a “massacre” against its own population. This intervention, led by France and the United States, was made in the name of Responsibility to protect, according to a UN mandate urging its members to use “all necessary means” to avoid “widespread and systematic attacks on the civilian population”. Was this intervention, in fact, driven by moral values and the responsibility to protect the Libyan population? The purpose of this article is to demonstrate that NATO´s intervention resembles a classical “regime change” operation mediated by “material” considerations, and that has little to do with humanitarian considerations. The intervention of NATO would also disrupt the proposals to implement a peaceful change, sweeping away hundreds of thousands of people, making Libya a failed state and provoking the emergence of multiple Islamist armed factionseng
dc.subject.proposalLibiaspa
dc.subject.proposalResponsabilidad de protegerspa
dc.subject.proposalIntervencionismospa
dc.subject.proposalOTANspa
dc.subject.proposalRealismospa
dc.identifier.doi10.29375/01240781.3298
dc.type.redcolhttp://purl.org/redcol/resource_type/CJournalArticle
dc.publisher.deparmentInstituto de Estudios Políticos IEPspa


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